Manila Times. "Former Aide of GMA Heads AFP Intelligence." 10 Mar. 2006. [http://www.manilatimes.net]
On 9 March 2006, Leonardo Calderon, a former military aide to President Arroyo, "took over as the new head of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Isafp), the militarys main intelligence arm."
Manne, Robert W. The Petrov Affair: The Politics of Espionage. Sydney and New York: Pergamon, 1987. London: Brassey's, 1987.
Cain, I&NS 6.1, says that Manne "has brought the history of Petrov affair totally up to date.... [This] thorough study will serve as a guide to other researchers still interested in the topic."
Manning, Martin, with Herbert Romerstein. Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004.
Includes a "Chronology of Important Events in American Propaganda, 1622-2003."
Manning, Robert, ed. War in the Shadows: The Vietnam Experience. Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1988.
McGehee, CIABASE January 1995 Update Report, comments that in many respects this "is the most informative, concise and accurate of many of the books on Vietnam in regard to the clandestine operations of the Special Operating Groups (SOGs) and the CIA's various programs."
Manning, Stephen. "Learning the Trade: Use and Misuse of Intelligence during the British Colonial Campaigns of the 1870s." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 644-660.
The focus here is on the Red River Campaign (1870) in Canada, the Ashanti war (1873-1874) in modern day Ghana, and the Zulu war (1879). In each instance, the commanders had limited information about the terrain over which they would be fighting; and they had to establish their own networks to keep up with the enemy.
[Manningham-Buller, Eliza] "The International Terrorist Threat to the UK." Times (London), 10 Nov. 2006. [http://www.timesonline.co.uk]
Text of a speech delivered on 9 November 2006: "I have been Director General of the Security Service/M15 since 2002. Before that I was Deputy Director General for five years. During that time, and before, I have witnessed a steady increase in the terrorist threat to the UK.... [T]oday, I want to set out my views on: the realities of the terrorist threat facing the UK in 2006; what motivates those who pose that threat; and what my Service is doing, with others, to counter it. I speak not as a politician, nor as a pundit, but as someone who has been an intelligence professional for 32 years."
Manosevitz, Jason U. "Needed: More Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks for Analysis -- The Case of Influence." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 4 (Dec. 2013): 15-22. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-57-no-4/pdfs/Manosevitz-FocusingConceptual%20Frameworks-Dec2013.pdf]
"The IC's overwhelming focus on SATs [structured analytic techniques] since 9/11 ... has crowded out attention to conceptual frameworks that analysts and policymakers need in order to address many of our national security questions.... This article reviews a framework for thinking about the concept of influence and suggests that conceptual frameworks can complement SATs to strengthen analytic tradecraft."
Mansfield, Celia. "Using Literature to Lift the Iron Curtain: Declassified CIA Documents Reveal Agency's Role in Publishing the Russian Language Version of Doctor Zhivago." Intelligencer 20, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 2014): 23-28.
The author provides context for the release of documents on the CIA's covert role in publishing Pasternak's epic novel in Russian in 1958. See also, Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, "During Cold War, CIA Used 'Doctor Zhivago' as a Tool to Undermine Soviet Union," Washington Post, 5 Apr. 2014.
Mansfield, Mark. "Reflections on Service: A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden." Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (Jun.2010): 41-47.
General Hayden makes many good points in this question-answer session. I found the following comment particularly insightful: Because of the DNI's job as senior intelligence advisor to the president, "the smooth functioning of the [intelligence] community, by default, tends to fall to the DNI staff. That is not a formula for success. Staffs don't run other staffs; staffs support principals."
Mansfield, Stephanie. The Richest Girl in the World: The Extravagant Life and Fast Times of Doris Duke. New York: Putnam's, 1992.
Surveillant 2.5: "A very brief involvement with OSS [in 1945] is described here."
Manthorpe, William H.J., Jr [CAPT/USN (Ret.)].
1. "The Origins of CNO Intelligence Plot." Part I. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 5-6.
2. comp. "The Creation and Evolution of CNO Intelligence Plot: Recollections." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 6-11, 18, 38.
3. comp. "The Creation and Evolution of CNO Intelligence Plot: Recollections." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 13-14.
4. comp. "CNO Intelligence Plot: Put to the Test -- Recollections, Part One." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 27, no. 1 (Jan. 2011): 38-41
This article covers the period from late 1961 to early 1962. .
Mantius, Peter. Shell Game: A True Story of Banking, Spies, Lies, Politics -- And the Arming of Saddam Hussein. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.
According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the author investigates how Banco Nazionale del Lavorno (BNL) was "part of the Reagan/Bush plans to use Saddam as a trading partner and political ally.... Mantius explains that Congress was thwarted in its investigation ... [by] the U.S. Justice Department, the State Department, and CIA."
Manville, Roger, and Heinrich Fraenkel. The Canaris Conspiracy: Secret Resistance to Hitler in the German Army. New York: McKay, 1969. [Chambers]
[WWII/Eur/Ger/Canaris & Resistance]
Manville, Roger, and Heinrich Fraenkel. The Men Who Tried to Kill Hitler New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1964.
Manwaring, Max G., ed. Environmental Security and Global Stability: Problems and Responses. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002.
Moss, Parameters 33.4, comments that the author "has compiled a succinct volume of expertise,... which makes the case solidly" that the current perspective of stability is so broad that it includes the environment as a security issue. This work "is a tour de force in identifying specific and typical problems and flashpoints." However, what Manwaring proposes as solutions "involves a level of international cooperation and an ability to engage in long-term analysis, planning, and implementation that is not characteristic of the world we live in." The book "is readable, not loaded with academic jargon and not overly lengthy."
For Matthew, Environmental Change & Security Project Report 9 (2003), the authors of this volume's seven case studies "do not demonstrate much familiarity with the academic literature and make no attempts to respond to familiar methodological concerns about case study selection or competing explanations that emphasize social variables." Nonetheless, the work provides "an interesting window into how the concept of environmental security is being used by some influential U.S. military thinkers."
Manzelmann, James [RADM/USNR].
Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command.
1. "Filling a Critical Need: Intel Reservists Mobilized in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 7-8.
2. "Naval Reserve Intelligence Professionals Meet the Challenge of Terror." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 7.
The author writes that the past year demonstrates "the continuing and ever-increasing value of the Naval Reserve Intelligence community to the active Navy's intelligence efforts, and to those of the joint services in support of our national interests."
Mapother, John R. "Berlin and the Cuban Crisis." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 12, no. 1 (1993): 1-3.
The Cuban Missile Crisis "was the final act of an attempt at military extortion that began in November 1958."
Mapother, John R. "Espionage versus Journalism." World Intelligence Review 15, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 1996): 1.
The author notes that journalists are assumed by security agencies to be seeking classified information; and, therefore, are not terribly effective cover for intelligence operations. In any event, the use of journalists by the CIA was rare during the Cold War.
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