Sullivan, Brian R. "From Little Brother to Senior Partner: Fascist Italian Perceptions of the Nazis and Hitler's Regime, 1930-1936." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 85-108.
Sullivan, Brian R. "From Little Brother to Senior Partner: Fascist Italian Perceptions of the Nazis and Hitler's Regime, 1930-1936." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 85-108.
Abstract: "[A]fter the Nazi putsch in Vienna, Mussolini joined the West against Germany.... Mussolini [later] abandoned Austria to get Hitler's support [in Ethiopia]. The Axis became Nazi-dominated."
[OtherCountries/Italy]
Sullivan, Brian R. "'A Highly Commendable Action': William J. Donovan's Intelligence Mission for Mussolini and Roosevelt, December 1935-February 1936." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 2 (Apr. 1991): 334-366.
This article concerns trips Donovan made, first, to Rome, Ethiopia, and a number of European capitals in late 1935-early 1936, and, later, to Britain in 1940. The author concludes that Donovan was deceived in the first trip by the Italians and in the second by the British. Much of what is used to tie together the strands of the first trip is highly speculative ("circumstantial evidence strongly suggests," "Donovan's probable direct or indirect service to the President," "it may be," and the like). There are also too many early citations of Anthony Cave Brown and Phillip Knightley to leave me completely comfortable with the article's foundation, despite the use of a number of original sources.
[WWII/Donovan][c]
Sullivan, Brian R. "Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism: A Clausewitzian-Historical Analysis." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: "Clausewitz' seeming rejection of the value of intelligence applies only on the tactical level. When he wrote, the speedy and accurate transmission of information was rare, making battlefield use problematic. Technological developments ... since Clausewitz' experience with war have largely ... eliminated such communications defects. Nonetheless, the effective application of intelligence still depends not so much on technological as on human factors, especially interagency cooperation, good leadership and political resolve."
[Overviews/Gen/00s]
Sullivan, John. GATEKEEPER: Memoirs of a CIA Polygraph Examiner. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), comments that the author "gives an insightful view of the problems the polygraph experience creates and the extensive efforts undertaken to minimize their impact on the subjects. No other book gives such a comprehensive look at the polygraph and its utility as a security tool in the community."
For Keiser, Proceedings 133.11 (Nov. 2007), "[t]his is a well-written work that should prove a valuable source for those interested in intelligence matters."
Impressed with the author's memory for "detail covering three decades' worth of harnessing people to the machine," Chapman, IJI&C 21.2 (Summer 2008), finds "discouraging" the thought that "the results of a polygraph examination can depend upon the disposition and character of the examiner." He concludes that,"after reading Sullivan's book," he is "inclined to believe the polygraph is a God-awful contraption."
[CIA/Components/DA & Memoirs]
Sullivan, John F. Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Clark comment: The author was a CIA polygraph examiner in Vietnam from 1971 to 1975.
To the Publisher's Weekly reviewer, the author provides a "unique voice and perspective in this detailed, anecdote-heavy ... account of his service during the Vietnam War."
Butler, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, Jun. 2002, calls this "an interesting addition to the history of the CIA in Vietnam.... Reading Of Spies and Lies gives one the sense of despair, disorder and corruption that existed in Vietnam; unfortunately one has to wade through a great deal of irrelevant information along the way. That is of course the weakness of a personal reminiscence. Sullivan is obsessively interested in presenting himself and his craft in a good light."
For Seamon, Proceedings, Nov. 2002, the author confuses the reader by skipping back and forth in time and by using an "abundance of CIA-concocted acronyms." Nevertheless, "the book is eminently readable." Sullivan's "character sketches, not only of his colleagues but also of high-ranking U.S. officials and military men, are often amusing and always informative."
Warren, Studies 47.1 (2003) and Intelligencer 13.2, comments that "Sullivan has explained in detail understandable to the layman how the polygraph works and how the CIA uses it.... He provides an interesting mélange of Saigon Station operations, Station management (and mismanagement), and the course of the Vietnam War in its last stages."
[CIA/Memoirs; Vietnam/Gen]
Sullivan, John P., and James J. Wirtz. "Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 13-25.
"The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group developed a networked approach to intelligence fusion. The TEW Group provides intelligence support to regional law enforcement, fire, and health agencies involved in the prevention of and response to terrorist acts." [Footnote omitted]
[Terrorism/00s]
Sullivan, Kevin. "Cuba Upset By Closure of Russian Spy Base." Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2001, A26.
"The Cuban government has angrily denounced Russia's decision to close a key electronic eavesdropping facility in Cuba, alleging that President Vladimir Putin made the move as a 'special gift' to President Bush before their meeting this weekend at an economic summit in Shanghai."
[LA/Cuba/Lourdes]
Sullivan, Kevin, and Mary Jordan.
1. "Mexico Returns Diplomat to Cuba." Washington Post, 5 Oct. 2000, A22.
On 4 October 2000, the Mexican government deported to Cuba an asylum-seeking Cuban diplomat, Pedro Riera Escalante, "who claimed that his true job for more 20 years was to spy" on the CIA.
2. "U.S. Tells Mexico to Protect Ex-Spy." Washington Post, 6 Oct. 2000, A22.
A 5 October 2000 statement by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City "declared ... that the Mexican government has a 'special responsibility' to ensure the safety" of Pedro Riera Escalante who was deported to Cuba after seeking political asylum in Mexico.
[LA/Cuba/Gen & Mexico]
Sullivan, Laura. "NSA 2nd-in-Command Is Transferred to London." Baltimore Sun, 28 Apr. 2000. [http://www.sunspot.net]
On 27 April 2000, NSA's deputy director Barbara McNamara announced that this summer she will become the liaison to British authorities at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
[NSA/00]
Sullivan, William C., and Bill Brown. The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI. New York: Norton, 1979. New York: Pinnacle, 1982.
Constantinides notes that Sullivan was number three in the FBI hierarchy prior to his split with Hoover in 1971. Sullivan tends to blame the bureau's shortcomings in counterintelligence and counterespionage work "on Hoover and the structure within the FBI, which many will consider valid as far as it goes but an incomplete explanation."
[FBI/To90s]
Sullivan, William H. Mission to Iran. New York: Norton, 1981.
Sullivan was U.S. Ambassador to Iran in 1979.
[GenPostwar/70s/Iran]
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