Rafalko, Frank J., ed. Rafalko, Frank J., ed.
1. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II, Volume One. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
2. A Counterintelligence Reader: World War II, Volume Two. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
3. A Counterintelligence Reader: Post-World War II to Closing the 20th Century, Volume Three. Washington, DC: NACIC, 1998.
Clark comment: These three volumes provide almost 900 pages of information on counterintelligence covering the entire span of U.S. history. Many cases mentioned have not previously been discussed widely.
4. A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into the New Millenium, Volume Four.Washington, DC: NACIC, [2004].
From "Preface": "We have taken material from official government documents, indictments from several espionage cases, and articles written by professors, scholars and counterintelligence officers. We have abridged some selections while trying not to change the sense of the original but we have not altered the original usage of the English language.... At the end of each chapter is a selected bibliography.... The reader is not all-inclusive and people may disagree with our selections, but at least we hope to have provided sufficient material to entice our colleagues to do further research."
All four volumes are available at: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps54742/counterintelligencereader/ci/docs/ and http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/index.html.
[Redmond, Paul.] "Remarks by Paul Redmond: CIRA Luncheon, 1 February 2002." CIRA Newsletter 27, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 3-7.
Counterintelligence is not nice; Americans do not like to do it; and we do it badly.
Risen, James. "Clinton Creates Post to Protect Nation's Secrets." New York Times, 5 Jan. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
President Clinton has signed a directive creating "a National Counterintelligence Executive charged with bringing a forward-looking, post-cold-war mentality to counterintelligence. Officials say the post is designed as the counterintelligence equivalent to the nation's drug czar....
"Administration officials and others familiar with the plan say that the czar will not be in charge of managing individual spy cases and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will retain its lead role in counterespionage investigations.... But officials said that the new office of the counterintelligence executive would replace the existing National Counterintelligence Center."
Clark comment: The reference here is to President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), entitled "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness for the 21st Century" (CI-21).
The PDD establishes (1) a National Counterintelligence Board of Directors, chaired by the FBI Director and comprised of the Deputy Defense Secretary, DDCI, and a senior representative of the Justice Department; (2) an NSC Deputies Committee, to include the Director of the FBI; (3) the position of National Counterintelligence Executive, selected by the Board of Directors with the concurrence of the Attorney General, DCI, and the Defense Secretary and reporting to the FBI Director, as Chairman of the Board of Directors, but responsible to the Board of Directors as a whole; (4) the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, chaired by the CI Executive and including senior counterintelligence officials from State, Defense, Justice, Energy, JCS, CIA, FBI, and the NSC Staff, at a minimum.
The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive assumes the functions and resources of the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). [AFIO WIN 02-01, 15 Jan. 2001]
Thompson, Terry. "Security and Motivational Factors in Espionage." Intelligencer 11, no. 1 (Jul. 2000): 1-9. American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 47-56.
The author addresses the "why" question in counterintelligence -- why would an individual risk everything in a crime that carries maximum penalties and an intense stigma? In the 1930s, 1940s, and the Cold War period, ideology was often the dominant motivation for commiting treason. Today, "recent trends indicate that pursuit of money is the most common motivation in espionage." Other motivations include anger/revenge, ego, and ethnicity.
Van Cleave, Michelle K. Counterintelligence and National Strategy. Washington, DC: School for National Security Executive Education, National Defense University Press, Apr. 2007.
The author was National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) from July 2003 to March 2006.
In this monograph, the author argues that the NCIX was established "to ensure the integration and strategic direction of CI community operations and and resources." A strategic approach to counterintelligence "is within reach, but we are not there yet.... [T]he DNI bureaucracy has become part of the problem as CI responsibilities have been dispersed across the the DNI organization." The existing bilateral interactions among the FBI, CIA, and military services "do not equal a cohesive, integrated whole." We need "an elite national CI strategic operations center ... to integrate and orchestrate the disparate operational and analytic activities across the CI community."
Van Cleave, Michelle K. "Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?" Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007): 1-13. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/strategic-counterintelligence.html]
"[T]o the extent strategic counterintelligence (CI) is addressed within CI or intelligence circles, it is controversial, poorly understood, and even more poorly executed because it does not fit comfortably within the existing architecture and approach to counterintelligence as it has developed within the United States.... In my view, the US CI community is at a crossroads. Either strategic counterintelligence is a theoretical construct with little to no place in the real world of US intelligence, in which case we really do not need a national level effort to direct it [the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)]; or it is a compelling national security mission. If it is the latter, we are losing precious time and advantage and should get on with the job."
Clark comment: The author was National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) from July 2003 to March 2006. See her Counterintelligence and National Strategy (Washington, DC: School for National Security Executive Education, National Defense University Press, Apr. 2007).
Wannall, W. Raymond. "Undermining Counterintelligence Capability." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 321-329. Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 19-23.
The author argues that there has been "a progressive loss of ability on the part of the intelligence agencies to carry out their functions, particularly in the domestic aspects of subversion and terrorism, dating back to, at the very least, the Watergate event of 1972 and the congressional hearings of 1973-1975."
West, Nigel [Rupert Allason]. Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2007.
Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy), 16 Feb. 2007, finds "many intriguing nuggets" in this work of "brief, capsule summaries of key topics, terms and events in the turbulent history of cold war counterintelligence." However, entries "are not sourced or annotated."
For Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), this work "has an impressive selection of cases, some little known, and a valuable bibliographic essay covering the evolution of books during the Cold War." Nonetheless, the volume has a number of factual errors; "the editorial practice of leaving the fact-checking and source determination to the reader diminishes the[] utility" of this work.
Maret, DIJ 16.2 (2007), says that this work provides "an international perspective to CI, with brief but detailed entries." However, the reviewer wonders "whether the dictionary format is the ideal arrangement for presentling highly complex historical and biographical material."
Wettering, Frederick L. "Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 265-300.
As indicated in the title, the argument here is that "counterintelligence is not being effectively conducted by U.S. counterintelligence agencies." This assessment is true for all three of the primary counterintelligence functions: "protecting secrets, frustrating attempts by foreign intelligence services to acquire those secrets, and catching Americans who spy for those foreign intelligence services."
Wise, David. Cassidy's Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas. New York: Random House, 2000.
Macartney, AFIO WIN 18-00 (5 May 2000), notes that this is the story of U.S. Army Master Sergeant Joseph Cassidy who "spent 23 years as an FBI double agent, feeding misleading information to his GRU handlers about US chemical weapons programs." Taylor, Booklist, 1-15 Jan. 2000, calls Cassidy's Run "[q]uality cloak-and-dagger history."
According to Vernon Loeb's on-line intelligence column, "IntelligenCIA: A Spy War Exposed," Washington Post, 1 May 2000, Operation SHOCKER was "the FBI's longest running counterintelligence case of the Cold War," lasting 21 years. Cassidy "exposed 10 Russian spy handlers and surfaced three 'illegal' Russian agents also used to help run the putative American spy," while passing thousands of pages "of carefully vetted classified documents" to the Russians.
For Naftali, New York Times, 30 Apr. 2000, this work "is a meticulous reconstruction of a hitherto unknown counterespionage case.... Wise raises the possibility that the Cassidy deception operation backfired with horrendous consequences. Citing circumstantial evidence, he suggests that it compelled the Soviets to expand production of chemical weapons.... But lacking any rich sources in the chemical and biological weapons programs of the former Soviet Union, Wise is not able to build a persuasive case.... Cassidy did his country a great service in a field of battle that was mostly in the mind, but very real. David Wise has done readers a service in bringing Cassidy's remarkable tale to life."
See also, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Polyakov's Run," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 56, no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 2000): 37-40, which discusses the deception/disinformation aspects of the Cassidy operation in connection with a similar operation run through Soviet Col. Dmitri Polyakov (Top Hat/Bourbon).
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