COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

General

1990s

H - O

Haver, Richard L. "The Ames Case: Catalyst for a National Counterintelligence Strategy." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 11-18.

There are "fundamental legal, organizational and managerial weaknesses" plaguing U.S. counterintelligence. These are "the lack of national authority and prestige, an outmoded organizational structure and lack of a unifying strategic concept to help manage and institutionalize inter-agency CI cooperation.... [S]ince Aldrich Ames' arrest, the Executive Branch ... has restructured and resubordinated the inter-agency staff responsible for managing US CI agencies." The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), created by Executive Order on 3 May 1994, "coordinates national-level CI activities." NACIC reports to the National Security Council (NSC) through the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), not to the DCI. This and other changes "are steps in the right direction"; but more needs to be done.

Herrington, Stuart A. Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1999.

According to Sullivan, NWCR, Summer 2000, the major focus of this book is the "extremely sensitive counterintelligence operations worldwide" of the Army's elite Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. This "is a fast-paced story of 'teamwork and cooperation between counterintelligence agents of the United States Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,' who 'collaborated closely with German, Swedish, Austrian, and Italian security officials.'"

Heuer, Richards J., Jr. "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment." Studies in Intelligence 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]

From Westerfield's headnote: The Angleton-Golitsin-Nosenko story "has been told many times -- but never, I think, as well as in this meticulous logical and empirical exercise."

Clark comment: Heuer goes beyond a review of the case, presenting "five criteria for making judgments about deception" and describing "how each was applied by different parties to the Nosenko controversy." He also draws conclusions from his discussion of the case. Heuer notes: "I remain firmly opposed to the view that the master plot was an irresponsible, paranoid fantasy. Given the information available at the time,... it would have been irresponsible not to have seriously considered this possibility. The mistake was not in pursuing the master plot theory, but in getting so locked into a position that one was unable to question basic assumptions or note the gradual accumulation of contrary evidence."

For the author (in comment to Clark 4/98), "The long-term value of this article is not what it says about Nosenko or Angleton, but the lessons about how bona fides analysis in general should be done."

Hood, William, James Nolan, and Sam Halpern. Myths Surrounding James Angleton: Lessons for American Counterintelligence. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4/5 was quite enthusiastic about this Working Group release: "This ... is an important item.... [It is] delicious 'I-was-there' stuff, with their prejudices -- for 'im or against 'im -- out on the table."

Bates, NIPQ 10.2, says that "[a]ll three are supportive of Angleton, but not to the point where they did not see his faults and at times disagree with him.... [T]hey do a remarkable job. If counterintelligence is your bag, this pamphlet is for you.... [It is] pretty obvious that [Cleveland C.] Cram was the first to comment in the discussion period and to attack the whole presentation." [See Cram's Of Moles and Molehunters.]

William R. Johnson, "Reader's Forum," IJI&C 7.3, asks the questions: Was Angleton right? Was Colby wrong? He answers with a qualified yes to each question. Angleton's firing "was the culmination of a conflict between two opposing operational philosophies that dated from the days of OSS."

Jelen, George F. "The Defensive Disciplines of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 381-399.

Kelly, Stephen D. "Neglect and Trendiness." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 91-97.

The "weakness that predisposes the Intelligence Community to suffer from Ames-type episodes is a basic Community-wide neglect of CI and a culture of 'functional trendiness' that causes intelligence functions or disciplines to fall in or out of favor based on the current fashion or emphasis of the moment."

Madsen, Wayne. "Intelligence Agency Threats to Computer Security." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 413-488.

Includes country-by-country listing of the "Computer-Communications Espionage Capabilities of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies" (pp. 446-488).

Major, David G. "Operation 'Famish': The Integration of Counterintelligence into the National Strategic Decisionmaking Process." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 29-55.

Operation "Famish" was the FBI codename for a series of national security policy decisions implemented March-November 1986. Eighty KGB and GRU officers were ordered to leave the United States. Major's article examines "the interagency structure and process" through which the Operation "Famish" decisions were made.

Morse, George P. America Twice Betrayed: Reversing Fifty Years of Government Security Failure. Silver Spring, MD: Bartleby Press, 1995.

Variations of the following comments by Warren appear in the CIRA Newsletter 20.3, WIR 14.3, and Surveillant 4.2: Morse "explains the defects of the current security clearance system and suggests a solution that would place all clearance procedures under a single agency." He argues that "[n]ot only does the system fail to protect," but the 67 or so Americans who cooperated with a foreign country against the United States were "persons cleared by it." Morse also emphasizes "the need for management to address the causes of the security weaknesses," and he suggests the novel approach of punishing both the traitors and the managers who allowed them to become traitors.

Andriani, MI 22.4, calls America Twice Betrayed a "seminal book on national security.... With sublime succinctness, [Morse] discusses a complex web of political, military, and economic threats to world peace.... [T]he author provides an astute analysis of the dire geopolitical and economic consequences of the Soviet collapse.... [This] is an exceptionally well written and meticulously researched work which addresses numerous issues spanning the full spectrum of national security."

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