Alsop, Stewart. "CIA,
the Battle for Secret Power." Saturday Evening Post, 27 Jul.
1963, 17-21. [Petersen] Alsop, Stewart. "CIA,
the Battle for Secret Power." Saturday Evening Post, 27 Jul.
1963, 17-21. [Petersen]
Attwood, William. "Former
Ambassador Says: A Few Kind Words for the CIA." Look, 18 Apr.
1967, 70-71.
Attwood was U.S. Ambassador to Guinea and Kenya in the 1960s.
Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
Clark comment: My review of Bagley's book is carried in Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 137-139
Ignatius, Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2007, says that Bagley "has gathered strong evidence" that Nosenko "could not have been who he initially said he was; that he could not have reviewed the Oswald file; that his claims about how the KGB discovered the identities of two CIA moles in Moscow could not have been right."
For Knight, St. Petersburg Times, 18 May 2007, the author "spends most of his book marshalling evidence of Nosenko's inaccuracies and inconsistencies," but "overlooks circumstances that might explain at least some of the discrepancies." The reviewer concludes that, in the end, "Bagley’s book fails to make a convincing case that Nosenko, who was finally exonerated by the CIA in 1977, was a fake defector."
Gordievsky, Spectator, 19 May 2007, calls this "perhaps the most amazing non-fiction spy book that has ever appeared during or after the Cold War"; it is written by "one of the most respected and knowledgeable experts on Soviet espionage." The author claims "on almost every page that much of what has been written up to now, stated and even asserted under oath by CIA officials, is in fact naive, utterly insensitive, blindly biased, [and] unprofessional." Gordievsky asks: Has Bagley succeeded in proving "that he was right and the Agency was wrong" about Nosenko? His answer: "A new generation of intelligence historians, analysts and operatives, who must read this very exciting book, will have to answer this and many other important professional questions."
In a review that shows how deeply the Nosenko debate continues to burn in the CIA soul, McCoy, CIRA Newsletter 32.2 (Summer 2007), dismisses this book as the author's attempt "to justify the mishandling of the only important operational assignment he had in 22 years of employment in the Clandestine Service." The reviewer accuses Bagley of resorting "to the same transparently invalid analytical methodology as was used in the original case he made against Nosenko." McCoy argues that "the case against Nosenko, and the painful, unprofessional, fundamentally illegal, disposition of it was actually inspired and stage-managed by [James] Angleton." Bagley, "Letters," CIRA Newsletter 32.4 (Winter 2007): 37-38, takes grave exception to this reviewer's comments and reiterates his argument that Nosenko was a KGB plant.
Thomas, NYT, 3 Jun. 2007, finds Bagley's account "a provocative new look at one of the great unresolved mysteries of the cold war.... Readers will need to be able to adapt to the mind-set of a counterintelligence officer sifting through the odd coincidences, connecting the dots, to fully appreciate and grasp the case against Nosenko. But this game of real-world Clue is worth it."
To Chapman, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), this is "a powerful book.... It is the best detailed account of the incredible capabilities of the Soviet Union's KGB." The reviewer seems to accept the author's presentation as the last word in the Nosenko matter (referring to the "ultimate vindication" of Angleton and others). He is particularly distressed by "the CIA's vilification and denigration of Bagley."
Wilson, Proceedings 134.2 (Feb. 2008), is of the opinion that "[t]he strength of this work is not that it sets the record straight or clears any names associated with the Nosenko file per se, but rather that it explains in minute detail the complexities, pitfalls, risks, impact of individual personalities, and potential controversy associated with most counterintelligence operations and investigations."
For a defense of the CIA's position, see: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment," Studies in Intelligence 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]
Barrett, David M. The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
DKR, AFIO WIN 33-05 (29 Aug. 2005), says that the author finds that "Congress was a firm, if not always wise, taskmaster in the agency's early decades. The CIA was repeatedly criticized for Intel failures, harassed by budget cutters and witch hunts, and pressed by legislators to slant analysis on politically charged issues.... Barrett has written a trenchant study of Congressional oversight that is in sharp contrast to a widespread, popular image of the CIA."
For Scheuer, Washington Post, 27 Nov. 2005, this work is "is a triumph of research." Faced with "widely dispersed research materials," the author has "displayed sound analytic sense and balance in their use." Along the way, he provides "superb portraits and assessments of the key players."
Snider, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), finds that the author paints "a far richer picture" of the Congress-CIA relationship "than we had before. Intriguing tidbits are scattered throughout," and "almost every chapter reveals something that we did not quite appreciate before.... [T]he DCI and other senior CIA officials appeared far more often before congressional committees ... than was previously understood. In 1958, for example, DCI Dulles appeared a surprising 27 times before 16 different committees.... Still, as Barrett’s account documents, a great deal of what passed for oversight during this period was informal and less than rigorous."
To Platt, I&NS 22.4 (Aug. 2007), the author provides "a detailed, comprehensive, and highly persuasive examination of congressional oversight" of the CIA "during the early Cold War.... Barrett's lengthy, somewhat densely written tome convincingly demolishes the myth of congressional deference to and salutary neglect towards the CIA from its founding in 1947 to the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961."
Nolen, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), lauds the author as "a master at culling the important details of secret history hidden in the dusty attic archives of America.... Barrett tells new tales of congressional oversight, reinterprets the old, and whets the appetite for more to come."
Finding the author's study "both fascinating and provocative," McCarthy, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews [http://www.h-net.org], Sep. 2008, opines that "it is unquestionably one of the most important books ever published on the early history of the CIA.... In the hands of a less talented author, this would have been an incredibly tedious book. Barrett, however, has a good eye for revealing quotations and fun anecdotes."
Blackstock, Paul W.
1. "The Central Intelligence Agency." Twentieth Century 21 (Spring 1966): 5-11.
2. "CIA: A Non-Inside Report." Worldview 9, no. 5 (May 1966): 10-13.
Braden, Thomas. "I'm
Glad the CIA Is 'Immoral.'" Saturday Evening Post, 20 May 1967,
10.
Brandon, Henry. "New
Tools for the CIA." Saturday Review, 22 May 1965, 16-18. [Petersen]
Bury, Jan. "Breaking Unbreakable Ciphers. The Asen Georgiev Spy Case." Cryptologia 33, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 74-88.
From Abstract: "The article discusses a Cold War spy case involving a Bulgarian national according to the documents preserved at the Polish Institute of National Remembrance. It details the modu operandi of both the US and Eastern Block secret services and the mistakes committed by both parties, which led to an agent's disclosure."
Asen Hristov Georgiev spied for the CIA from 1956 until his arrest by Bulgarian State Security in 1963.
Cabell,
Charles A., Jr. [BGEN/USAF (Ret.)], ed. A Man of Intelligence: Memoirs
of War, Peace, and the CIA. Boulder, CO: Impavide Publications, 1997.
According to Peake, AFIO WIN 42-99 (23 Oct. 1999), these are the memoirs of Gen. Charles Cabell, DDCI 1953-1962, who held a succession of important Army Air Force and Air Force staff and intelligence positions before being named as DDCI under Allen Dulles. Peake notes that Cabell devotes "[m]ore than 100 pages ... to his CIA service, and of particular interest here are his candid comments about the Bay of Pigs operation in which he was directly involved." Cabell's assessment of the reasons for the Bay of Pigs failure is "dispassionate," but he does not mince words either. This book "is a valuable contribution to the history of Air Force intelligence and the early years of the CIA."
Collins, Frederick
W. "In Defence of the CIA." Round Table 57 (Jan. 1967):
115-121.
Cook, Fred J. "The
CIA." Nation, 24 Jun. 1961, 8-15, 529-572. [Petersen]
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