Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.The references included here overlap with materials relating both to Kim Philby and to KGB history and operations. For reviews and other comments on these items, see the appropriate subject files.
Yuri I. Nosenko died 23 August 2008 "under an assumed name in a Southern state, according to intelligence officials." Walter Pincus, "Yuri I. Nosenko, 81; KGB Agent Who Defected to the U.S.," Washington Post, 27 Aug. 2008, B5.
Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
Clark comment: My review of Bagley's book is carried in Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 137-139
Ignatius, Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2007, says that Bagley "has gathered strong evidence" that Nosenko "could not have been who he initially said he was; that he could not have reviewed the Oswald file; that his claims about how the KGB discovered the identities of two CIA moles in Moscow could not have been right."
For Knight, St. Petersburg Times, 18 May 2007, the author "spends most of his book marshalling evidence of Nosenko's inaccuracies and inconsistencies," but "overlooks circumstances that might explain at least some of the discrepancies." The reviewer concludes that, in the end, "Bagley’s book fails to make a convincing case that Nosenko, who was finally exonerated by the CIA in 1977, was a fake defector."
Gordievsky, Spectator, 19 May 2007, calls this "perhaps the most amazing non-fiction spy book that has ever appeared during or after the Cold War"; it is written by "one of the most respected and knowledgeable experts on Soviet espionage." The author claims "on almost every page that much of what has been written up to now, stated and even asserted under oath by CIA officials, is in fact naive, utterly insensitive, blindly biased, [and] unprofessional." Gordievsky asks: Has Bagley succeeded in proving "that he was right and the Agency was wrong" about Nosenko? His answer: "A new generation of intelligence historians, analysts and operatives, who must read this very exciting book, will have to answer this and many other important professional questions."
In a review that shows how deeply the Nosenko debate continues to burn in the CIA soul, McCoy, CIRA Newsletter 32.2 (Summer 2007), dismisses this book as the author's attempt "to justify the mishandling of the only important operational assignment he had in 22 years of employment in the Clandestine Service." The reviewer accuses Bagley of resorting "to the same transparently invalid analytical methodology as was used in the original case he made against Nosenko." McCoy argues that "the case against Nosenko, and the painful, unprofessional, fundamentally illegal, disposition of it was actually inspired and stage-managed by [James] Angleton." Bagley, "Letters," CIRA Newsletter 32.4 (Winter 2007): 37-38, takes grave exception to this reviewer's comments and reiterates his argument that Nosenko was a KGB plant.
Thomas, NYT, 3 Jun. 2007, finds Bagley's account "a provocative new look at one of the great unresolved mysteries of the cold war.... Readers will need to be able to adapt to the mind-set of a counterintelligence officer sifting through the odd coincidences, connecting the dots, to fully appreciate and grasp the case against Nosenko. But this game of real-world Clue is worth it."
To Chapman, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), this is "a powerful book.... It is the best detailed account of the incredible capabilities of the Soviet Union's KGB." The reviewer seems to accept the author's presentation as the last word in the Nosenko matter (referring to the "ultimate vindication" of Angleton and others). He is particularly distressed by "the CIA's vilification and denigration of Bagley."
Wilson, Proceedings 134.2 (Feb. 2008), is of the opinion that "[t]he strength of this work is not that it sets the record straight or clears any names associated with the Nosenko file per se, but rather that it explains in minute detail the complexities, pitfalls, risks, impact of individual personalities, and potential controversy associated with most counterintelligence operations and investigations."
For a defense of the CIA's position, see: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment," Studies in Intelligence 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]
Brook-Shepard, Gordon. The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989. Owl Books, 1990. [pb] DK268A1B76
According to Surveillant 1.3, Brook-Shepard presents "dramatic stories..., many based on previously unpublished materials and interviews." Petersen calls The Storm Birds a "useful summary of prominent cases," and notes that it includes a short annotated bibliography. Chambers sees the book as an "overview of several very important ... defectors" with "lots of useful insights."
For Cram, The Storm Birds "is not only an exciting read but is accurate in almost every respect." Brook-Shepard makes "judgments that are objective and fair." This is a "fascinating account of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence officials defected and the impact they had on the West." Of the two most controversial cases, Golitsyn and Nosenko, "he has done a good job of sorting out the facts and arriving at fair judgments."
Duncan,
Susanna. "'Stone,' The Man Who Warned About the Moles." New
York, 27 Feb. 1978, 28-38.
Petersen: "Nosenko, 'Fedora,' Cherepanov cases."
Ennis, Jerry D.
1. "Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent?" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 26-45.
The answer to the author's question is, "no." It appears that James Angleton's suggestion otherwise was typically Angleton muddying the waters.
2. "What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn?" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 905-909.
The author revisits the conclusions in his earlier article about what Angleton said about Golitsin and why he said it. He argues that Angleton's point was that Golitsin had decided to defect long before he did, and had been gathering information to pass along when he did defect.
Epstein, Edward Jay. Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1989.
Thomas Powers, NYRB (17 Aug. 1989) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 123-139, calls Deception "a richly suggestive but ultimately inconclusive work, which comes closer than Angleton himself ever did to laying out his case." On the negative side, Epstein "makes no attempt to weigh Angleton's case.... He has an obligation to the reader to pass some sort of judgment on these wild claims, but gives us nothing of the kind."
According to London, IJI&C 4.1, Epstein "points out in exquisite detail and breathtaking logic" that "the target of disinformation ... must be in a state of mind to want deception." This is a "much needed antidote to the overheated rhetoric of the moment [1990]."
To Cram (1993), Epstein's work now has "the smell of attic dust.... The first 105 pages explain Angleton's theories.... The remainder ... describes various forms of deception." The author dismisses glasnost "as simply another massive KGB deception." The book contains "many errors and misinterpretations.... Like Legend, it is propaganda for Angleton and essentially dishonest." It is "[o]ne of many bad books inspired by Angleton after his dismissal that have little basis in fact."
NameBase comments that the "second half of this book examines some major deceptions in the twentieth century: the Soviet 'Trust' in the 1920s, Hitler's armament inventory in the 1930s, Soviet faking for our spy satellites, and the mole wars. Then Epstein looks at Glasnost in the Soviet Union.... Epstein is ... worth reading, even after Angleton has been largely discredited and Epstein's premise is forced to fly in the face of almost all available evidence."
Epstein, Edward Jay. Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald. New York: Reader's Digest/McGraw Hill, 1978.
According to Cram, Angleton was the "major source on Nosenko," and Epstein supports Angleton's theories. The book "has two parts: the first is about Nosenko and Angleton's belief that he was part of a KGB deception operation; the second is about Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union.... One of the [book's] chief critics, George Lardner of The Washington Post, wrote: 'What Epstein has written ... is a fascinating, important, and essentially dishonest book.... It is paranoid. It is naive.'" Pforzheimer says this book "leaves more questions unanswered than it answers with respect to the assassination of the President."
Epstein, Edward Jay.
1. "Nosenko: The Red Herring." New York 11 (27 Feb. 1978): 34-35. [Peterson]
2. "The Spy Wars." New York Times Magazine, 28 Sep. 1980, 34 ff. [http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/spywars.htm]
"While public debate over the CIA ... has narrowly focused on the charge that the agency has abused its power by spying on domestic groups outside its legal purview, the secret concern in intelligence circles ... is that the CIA is not spying effectively on its principal adversary: the Soviet bloc." The author finds the reasons for CIA failures in recruiting Soviet spies in the theories of James Angleton and Tennant Bagley that the CIA had been "penetrated" by Soviet intelligence.
3. "The War Within CIA." Commentary 66 (Aug. 1978): 35-39. [http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/Colby.htm]
This piece is highly critical of former DCI William Colby's revealing of the CIA's "family jewels." The author suggests that Colby did so in order to generate an excuse to get rid of James Angleton.
4. "War of the Moles: An Interview." 3 parts. New York 11 (27 Feb.-13 Mar. 1978): 28-33, 55-59, 12-13. [Peterson]
5. "When the CIA Was Almost Wrecked." Parade Magazine [Washington Post], 14 Oct. 1984, 8-11.
Epstein, Edward Jay. "The Spy Who Came Back From The Dead." Life, Sep. 1986. [http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/archived/spy.htm]
The author finds parallels between the defection/redefection of Vitaliy Sergeyevich Yurchenko in 1985 and the defection of Yuri Nosenko in 1964.
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