Cram, Cleveland C. Cram, Cleveland C.
1. Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977-1992, An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993. Available at: http://cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Of_Moles_and_Molehunters.htm.
Clark comment: Although it remains the object of considerable ire from Angleton supporters, Cram's monograph is a great read for anyone interested in the literature of intelligence. Readers need not take Cram's opinions as the gospel, but they will learn about more things than "merely" Angleton. For an antidote to Cram's view of Angleton, see Hood, Nolen, and Halpern, Myths Surrounding James Angleton (1993).
Cram died on 8 January 1999 at the age of 81: J.Y. Smith, "CIA Official Cleveland C. Cram: Specialist in Counterintelligence; Conducted Influential Study of Legendary Agency Spymaster," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1999, B6.
For the Surveillant 3.4 reviewer, this monograph is an "opinionated, literate, fresh look at some items in the CI literature from an Agency insider." It offers a "terrific, though brief, historical review ... [and is] well worth reading." Bates, NIPQ 10.2, saw things differently: The "title is, at best, misleading because the monograph is really an attack on ... Angleton, blaming him for so many things I can't chronicle them here.... [T]his is not the way to write history."
2. "Of Moles and Molehunters: Spy Stories." Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 129-137.
"Editor's note: The following background essay first appeared in a monograph published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence in October 1993." (See above)
Epstein, Edward Jay. Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1989.
Thomas Powers, NYRB (17 Aug. 1989) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 123-139, calls Deception "a richly suggestive but ultimately inconclusive work, which comes closer than Angleton himself ever did to laying out his case." On the negative side, Epstein "makes no attempt to weigh Angleton's case.... He has an obligation to the reader to pass some sort of judgment on these wild claims, but gives us nothing of the kind."
According to London, IJI&C 4.1, Epstein "points out in exquisite detail and breathtaking logic" that "the target of disinformation ... must be in a state of mind to want deception." This is a "much needed antidote to the overheated rhetoric of the moment [1990]."
To Cram (1993), Epstein's work now has "the smell of attic dust.... The first 105 pages explain Angleton's theories.... The remainder ... describes various forms of deception." The author dismisses glasnost "as simply another massive KGB deception." The book contains "many errors and misinterpretations.... Like Legend, it is propaganda for Angleton and essentially dishonest." It is "[o]ne of many bad books inspired by Angleton after his dismissal that have little basis in fact."
NameBase comments that the "second half of this book examines some major deceptions in the twentieth century: the Soviet 'Trust' in the 1920s, Hitler's armament inventory in the 1930s, Soviet faking for our spy satellites, and the mole wars. Then Epstein looks at Glasnost in the Soviet Union.... Epstein is ... worth reading, even after Angleton has been largely discredited and Epstein's premise is forced to fly in the face of almost all available evidence."
Halpern, Samuel, and
Hayden Peake. "Did Angleton Jail Nosenko?" International Journal
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 451-464.
The authors conclude that "Admiral Turner got it wrong" in the accusation that Angleton was responsible for the incarceration of Nosenko. That responsibility rests with SR Division, Dave Murphy, and others, but not Angleton.
In a personal interview in February 1998, Dave Murphy commented, "I wish Sam had talked to me before he wrote the article," and suggested that the article had failed to take all the facts into account.
Hersh, Seymour M. "The
Angleton Story." New York Times Magazine, 25 Jun. 1978, 13 ff.
[Petersen]
Heuer, Richards J., Jr. "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment." Studies in Intelligence
31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified
Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]
From Westerfield's headnote: The Angleton-Golitsin-Nosenko story "has been told many times -- but never, I think, as well as in this meticulous logical and empirical exercise."
Clark comment: Heuer goes beyond a review of the case, presenting "five criteria for making judgments about deception" and describing "how each was applied by different parties to the Nosenko controversy." He also draws conclusions from his discussion of the case. Heuer notes: "I remain firmly opposed to the view that the master plot was an irresponsible, paranoid fantasy. Given the information available at the time,... it would have been irresponsible not to have seriously considered this possibility. The mistake was not in pursuing the master plot theory, but in getting so locked into a position that one was unable to question basic assumptions or note the gradual accumulation of contrary evidence."
For the author (in comment to Clark 4/98), "The long-term value of this article is not what it says about Nosenko or Angleton, but the lessons about how bona fides analysis in general should be done."
Holzman, Michael. James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Counterintelligence. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008.
Hawkes, Times Literary Supplement (10 Jun. 2009), says that this "brisk, uncluttered book offers valuable access to previously untapped material on Angleton."
Hood, William, James Nolan, and Sam Halpern. Myths Surrounding James Angleton: Lessons for American Counterintelligence. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.
Clark comment: Reading this piece together with Cleveland Cram's Of Moles and Molehunters (1993) will not tell readers all they need to know about the disputes surrounding Angleton, but careful perusers will certainly come away with some understanding of the complexities involved.
The reviewer in Surveillant 3.4/5 was quite enthusiastic about this Working Group release: "This ... is an important item.... [It is] delicious 'I-was-there' stuff, with their prejudices -- for 'im or against 'im -- out on the table." Johnson, "Reader's Forum," IJI&C 7.3, asks the questions: Was Angleton right? Was Colby wrong? He answers with a qualified yes to each question. Angleton's firing "was the culmination of a conflict between two opposing operational philosophies that dated from the days of OSS."
Bates, NIPQ 10.2, says that "[a]ll three are supportive of Angleton, but not to the point where they did not see his faults and at times disagree with him.... [T]hey do a remarkable job. If counterintelligence is your bag, this pamphlet is for you.... [It is] pretty obvious that [Cleveland C.] Cram was the first to comment in the discussion period and to attack the whole presentation."
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