Breckinridge, Scott
D. "CIA's Inspector General -- The DCI's Independent Eye: Another View."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3,
no. 3 (Fall 1989): 419-424.
Breckinridge, Scott
D. "CIA's Inspector General -- The DCI's Independent Eye: Another View."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3,
no. 3 (Fall 1989): 419-424.
This article takes issue with Kaiser, "The Watchers' Watchdog...," IJI&C 3.1:55-75, noting that the tenor of Kaiser's article is "the CIA IG function has been ineffective.... This was the apparent basis for proposals to change the operation. A variety of legislative proposals were discussed.... I take exception with the premises Mr. Kaiser offers in support of the proposals, on the basis that they are badly grounded factually." This amounts to an effort to "use misrepresentation as a basis for extending congressional involvement into detailed internal management of the Executive."
Clark comment: I served on the Inspector General Staff in the mid-1980s. My experience in that timeframe has produced a view of the IG function that is much closer to that of Breckinridge than Kaiser. However, neither Breckinridge (whose tenure with the Inspector General predates mine) nor I have current, first-hand experience in that arena. Hints that have made their way into public view from the lengthy tenure of Fred Hitz, the CIA's first statutory IG, suggest significant changes in a number of ways in that function.
Burkhalter, Edward
A., Jr. "The Role of the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff." Signal
39 (Sep. 1984): 33-35. [Petersen]
Haines, Gerald K. "The CIA's Own Effort to Understand and Document Its Past: A Brief History of the CIA History Program, 1950-1995." Intelligence and National Security
12, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 201-223.
Clark comment: Individuals with limited or narrow experience in the federal bureaucracy often make silly errors of emphasis in their comments on government activities. Haines stumbles in this way in what is overall a useful survey of the ups and downs of the CIA's effort to record its own history. It is not that he has gotten his facts wrong, but, rather, that he deploys them in ways that just miss the mark. His naivete shows in his first 10 words with a reference to "the vast CIA bureaucracy." As federal bureaucracies go, the CIA does not even qualify as "large," much less "vast." In addition, the author too often misjudges the motives of the Agency's top decision makers and has cast his net so narrowly that he does not even mention the name of Walter Pforzheimer.
Kaiser, Frederick M.
"The Watchers' Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1989):
55-75.
For a critique of the factual basis and conclusions of this article, see above: Breckinridge, "CIA's Inspector General...," IJI&C 3.3:419-424.
Leggett, Robert E.
"The DCI's Center for the Study of Intelligence: Meeting the Challenges
of a Changing World Environment." American Intelligence Journal
17, no. 1/2 (1996): 47-51.
The author discusses organization, activities, and challenges of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). Leggett heads the CSI's Community Coordination Group, which oversees and coordinates the Community's historical declassification effort.
"Several members of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence have questioned whether CIA Inspector General-designate Britt Snider could, if confirmed, maintain his independence from CIA Director George J. Tenet, who is a close friend."
Pincus, Walter. "Independence of CIA Nominee Questioned: Inspector General-Designate Snider Is Friend, Colleague of Agency Director Tenet." Washington Post, 12 Jul. 1998, A8.
"Several members of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence have questioned whether CIA Inspector General-designate Britt Snider could, if confirmed, maintain his independence from CIA Director George J. Tenet, who is a close friend."
Radsan, A. John. "Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?" Journal of National Security Law and Policy 2 (2008): 201-255. [http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/publications/jnslp/01_Radsan Master 09_11_08.pdf]
"Throughout American history, Presidents have been tempted by Commander-in-Chief powers and by executive authority to keep information classified.... If Presidents have insisted on the utmost secrecy, spymasters have accommodated them, cutting out Vice Presidents, cabinet secretaries, and ambassadors. The spymasters have also cut out other intelligence officers.... The harsh reality in intelligence activities is that cutting out a few lawyers is just as easy, even easier....
"Some Presidents, like President Carter, may have strictly adhered to the letter of the law on intelligence activities. Some Presidents, like President Reagan, may have strayed. Some CIA General Counsels have followed their President's course; some have strayed. Even when Presidents and General Counsels share similar courses, they are not always in lock-step, because too many layers of executive authority ... often stand between them. Yet the President and the General Counsel have an effect on each other, even if that effect is indirect and not easily measured....
"The CIA's Office of General Counsel, when it lives up to its promise, serves as one guard over the activities of the CIA. The lawyers there are not perfect, but ... they ... [constitute] some sort of guard over the guardians."
[Smith, Jeffrey H.]
"An Interview with Former CIA General Counsel Jeffrey H. Smith."
National Security Law Report 18, no. 6 (Oct. 1996): 1, 4-7.
Chairman of the ABA's Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Paul Schott Stevens, interviews Jeffrey H. Smith, "shortly after he returned to private law practice."
Snider, L. Britt. "Creating a Statutory Inspector General at the CIA." Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter-Spring 2001): 15-21.
The author worked on this legislation while SSCI General Counsel. Nine years later, he became the second person appointed to the post. Here, he takes the reader through the legislative process that led to including the statutory IG provisions in the 1990 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Weiner, Tim. "In
Search of the C.I.A.'s Bad Apples: As Inspector General, Fred Hitz's Job
Is to Spy on the Spies." New York Times, 30 Jul. 1995, 12 (N).
The CIA's Inspector General gets everything "from espionage misconduct to expense-account fudging." With DCI Deutch's arrival, "Hitz was the only senior official who kept his job." Cases mentioned include Ames, Guatemala, and Janine Brookner. Quotes by Hitz include a seemingly gratuitous slam at IG's office before his arrival. Weiner gives the number of IG "investigators" as 123.
Weiner, Tim. "Veteran
C.I.A. Official Quits, But Will Finish Investigations." New York
Times, 3 Oct. 1997, A9 (N).
Fred Hitz, who has held the job since October 1990, will leave the Inspector General's job for a teaching position at Princeton University.
Weller, Geoffrey R.
"Comparing Western Inspectors General of Intelligence and Security."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97): 383-406.
Statutory offices of Inspectors General (or similar entities in the case of the United Kingdom's offices of Security Service Commissioner and Intelligence Services Commissioner) have been created in the Western democracies over the past 15 years as part of an "overall increase in the degree of oversight accorded intelligence agencies.... The Inspectors General have generally built up good reputations for their largely well done ... work.... But ... the IGs have not always been able to anticipate problems and give early warning."
Wines, Michael. "Independent Watchdog Takes Post at C.I.A." New York Times, 30 Nov. 1990. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Frederick P. Hitz, a former CIA "undercover officer," began work on 29 November 1990 as the CIA's "first independent inspector general." Hitz will report to DCI William H. Webster, but "can be removed from his job only by the President."
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