CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memoir Literature

B

Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism. New York: Crown, 2002.

According to Gellman, Washington Post, 17 Mar. 2002, "Baer leaps from these pages as a zealous and creative man, courageous to the brink of recklessness, and altogether lacking the political and diplomatic judgment that an intelligence agency needs at the top. What the book does well is provide a spy's-eye view of CIA intrigues by one of the agency's best. And it makes a persuasive case, with much amusing evidence, that the CIA lost interest in the skills Baer had to offer....

"Baer can write authoritatively on one page and with cartoonish fancy on another.... [He] adds an intriguing chapter to the literature on the Clinton administration's betrayal of Iraqi coup plotters in 1995. But he undermines the reader's trust with assertions that then-national security adviser Anthony Lake masterminded an FBI investigation meant to punish Baer for his role. No one who knows the mutual loathing between Louis Freeh and the Clinton White House will buy that."

Peake, AFIO WIN 31-02, 5 Aug. 2002, and Intelligencer 13.2, finds that See No Evil is "a memoir of disillusionment written in a positive style, not the bitter tone of those who wrote because they could not cope with the demands of the clandestine life.... Baer's comments on the tradecraft of espionage as practiced on the ground ... will enlighten historians and laymen interested in the profession.... This is a fine memoir, one of the best ever written." To Berkowitz. IJI&C15.4, this book "is a great read." The author "is direct and honest ... and tells a good story."

Clark comment: I enjoyed reading Baer's See No Evil. The words flow in a spritely fashion from the page, and Baer certainly touched plenty of potentially important events in less frequented parts of the world. Much of what he writes rings true whether or not the reader is familiar with the details of each episode he spotlights. That does not mean, however, that he has captured the "capital T" truth.

Baer's view is that of the classic field operative -- essentially, "if politics/Headquarters/ Washington hadn't screwed it up, we could have pulled it off." It is true that too often those making the decisions back in Washington do not share the field operative's intimate knowledge of the situation on the ground. But it is just as often true that the person in the field has little understanding of the factors at play beyond his/her vision.

Baer complains that some Headquarters-based personnel considered him a "cowboy." From reading his memoirs, I have to conclude that they were correct. I would argue, however, that the CIA and the United States need a few such cowboys, although we probably should not put them in charge of things.

Bagley, Tennent H. Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

Clark comment: My review of Bagley's book is carried in Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 137-139

Ignatius, Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2007, says that Bagley "has gathered strong evidence" that Nosenko "could not have been who he initially said he was; that he could not have reviewed the Oswald file; that his claims about how the KGB discovered the identities of two CIA moles in Moscow could not have been right."

For Knight, St. Petersburg Times, 18 May 2007, the author "spends most of his book marshalling evidence of Nosenko's inaccuracies and inconsistencies," but "overlooks circumstances that might explain at least some of the discrepancies." The reviewer concludes that, in the end, "Bagley’s book fails to make a convincing case that Nosenko, who was finally exonerated by the CIA in 1977, was a fake defector."

Gordievsky, Spectator, 19 May 2007, calls this "perhaps the most amazing non-fiction spy book that has ever appeared during or after the Cold War"; it is written by "one of the most respected and knowledgeable experts on Soviet espionage." The author claims "on almost every page that much of what has been written up to now, stated and even asserted under oath by CIA officials, is in fact naive, utterly insensitive, blindly biased, [and] unprofessional." Gordievsky asks: Has Bagley succeeded in proving "that he was right and the Agency was wrong" about Nosenko? His answer: "A new generation of intelligence historians, analysts and operatives, who must read this very exciting book, will have to answer this and many other important professional questions."

In a review that shows how deeply the Nosenko debate continues to burn in the CIA soul, McCoy, CIRA Newsletter 32.2 (Summer 2007), dismisses this book as the author's attempt "to justify the mishandling of the only important operational assignment he had in 22 years of employment in the Clandestine Service." The reviewer accuses Bagley of resorting "to the same transparently invalid analytical methodology as was used in the original case he made against Nosenko." McCoy argues that "the case against Nosenko, and the painful, unprofessional, fundamentally illegal, disposition of it was actually inspired and stage-managed by [James] Angleton." Bagley, "Letters," CIRA Newsletter 32.4 (Winter 2007): 37-38, takes grave exception to this reviewer's comments and reiterates his argument that Nosenko was a KGB plant.

Thomas, NYT, 3 Jun. 2007, finds Bagley's account "a provocative new look at one of the great unresolved mysteries of the cold war.... Readers will need to be able to adapt to the mind-set of a counterintelligence officer sifting through the odd coincidences, connecting the dots, to fully appreciate and grasp the case against Nosenko. But this game of real-world Clue is worth it."

To Chapman, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), this is "a powerful book.... It is the best detailed account of the incredible capabilities of the Soviet Union's KGB." The reviewer seems to accept the author's presentation as the last word in the Nosenko matter (referring to the "ultimate vindication" of Angleton and others). He is particularly distressed by "the CIA's vilification and denigration of Bagley."

Wilson, Proceedings 134.2 (Feb. 2008), is of the opinion that "[t]he strength of this work is not that it sets the record straight or clears any names associated with the Nosenko file per se, but rather that it explains in minute detail the complexities, pitfalls, risks, impact of individual personalities, and potential controversy associated with most counterintelligence operations and investigations."

For a defense of the CIA's position, see: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment," Studies in Intelligence 31, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 71-101. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 379-414 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). [Available as a 300 kb (vice 2.6 mb thanks to Kathrine M. Graham/NMSU) pdf file at: http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/H_folder/Heuer_on_NosenkoV1.pdf]

Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003.

Clark comment: The authorship of this work rests with a 30-year CIA veteran whose assignments including running CIA operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Soviet operations in the 1990s (Bearden) and a New York Times reporter who covers intelligence matters (Risen).

Finding this "a most interesting and very readable account of the conflict waged between the intelligence agencies of the two powers," Friedman, CIRA Newsletter 28.3, concludes that the story "is guaranteed to hold the reader's attention." Similarly, Peake, Studies 48.4 (2004), states flatly that "[t]his is a splendid book by any measure."

Prados, Washington Post, 27 Aug. 2003, notes that Bearden's book "vividly demonstrates" that "his Cold War résumé covers the full gamut of clandestine operations.... Bearden provides a lively picture of how the officers at CIA headquarters reacted to the world of Soviet intelligence." One of the book's weaknesses that it "is preoccupied with its story and short on analysis or introspection.... In addition, Bearden is completely silent on some matters.... Yet these are small gaps in an arresting, large-canvas history. 'The Main Enemy' is a first-rate account from the front lines of the Cold War."

For Stein, NYTBR, 27 Jul. 2003, "[i]f there's a more revealing account of spies at work, it's classified." However, "[t]he revelations of 'The Main Enemy' are more in the details than the substance.... But the book unveils in astonishing detail a number of C.I.A. operations unreported or only rumored until now."

Drew, New York Times, 4 May 2003, focuses on the book's assertion that "four of more than a dozen Russians caught spying for the West in the mid-1980's could not have been betrayed" by Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Edward Lee Howard. This leads to a conclusion that there is "an as yet unidentified traitor" within the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. JK468I6B55

Shryock, WIR 15.6, sees Bissell's memoirs as "thoughtful, candid, provocative, and ultimately puzzling." However, at times, the author "conveys his thoughts in a stiff, disorganized, and even excessively lawyerly manner." Falcoff, National Interest, Winter 1996-1997, finds the book "informative and stimulating," despite "its unexciting prose and a tendency to flatten what must have been far more dramatic events."

For Immerman, Choice 34.2, this work is disappointing but "nevertheless has value. It provides a succinct history of some of America's most dramatic Cold War initiatives and insight into the mindsets of their architects." Chambers concludes that "[t]here are no major disclosures. However, Bissell's personal recollections do add a new and useful viewpoint to the history of these operations." Click for a full review by Chambers.

"Methodological problems" with Bissell's memoirs are raised by Westerfield, Studies (Winter 1998-1999). Noting the clear acknowledgement that the "actual writing was done by [Bissell's] two collaborators," Westerfield also is concerned that "the posthumous additions (not clearly delineated ) obscure throughout what words were ever personally approved by Bissell and what ones were not."

Borel, Paul Arnold. Along the Way: Fragments from My Three Score Ten Years. Great Falls, VA: River Bend House, 1986.

These are the gentle and fond memoirs of a very nice man. There is virtually nothing controversial or startling revealed here. Nonetheless, what Borel has to say is not unimportant, given that his CIA career spanned the period 1947 to 1972. Borel was the recipient of one of the 50 "Trailblazer Awards" presented during the Agency's 50th anniversary celebration.

Breckinridge, Scott D. The CIA and the Cold War: A Memoir. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

Periscope 18.2 provides the following biographic data on Breckinridge: "For three years, 1954-1957, he was the CIA briefing officer for the White House Staff. He represented CIA before the 1975-1976 congressional investigating committees. He was on the Inspector-General Staff at CIA from 1962-1979. He dealt extensively with the Church Committee on Covert Action issues." IJI&C 8.1 adds that "Breckinridge ... served for six years as [CIA's] Deputy Inspector General."

Mapother, CIRA Newsletter 14.2, believes that "[i]ntelligence officers will find the book illuminating.... The author's prose ... is not sprightly, but it is sober.... The author has done considerable service: to the CIA ... and to the reader." Surveillant 3.6 comments that there are "[m]any stories by those on the sidelines but their 'facts' are not always correct. Just because someone was in the vicinity he may not have known what was going on above and below him."

Bush, George. Looking Forward. New York: Doubleday, 1987.

The former DCI (1976-1977) provides circumspect coverage of his tenure in a position that was a brief interlude in a busy life.

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