Best, Richard A., Jr., and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Dec. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf.
A judicious look at the issues surrounding the 9/11 Commission's Recommendation 32, which called for responsibility for all covert and clandestine paramilitary activities to be shifted to the Defense Department.
Buhle, Paul. "The CIA and the (Jewish) Liberals." Tikkun 15, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2000): 13-17.
This is a lament about the “corrupting” influence that the cooperation between “Cold War liberals” and the CIA had on Jewish liberal intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s.
Carter, John J.
1. Covert Operations as a Tool of Presidential Foreign Policy in American History from 1800 to 1920: Foreign Policy in the Shadows. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2000.
2. Covert Operations and the Emergence of the Modern American Presidency, 1920-1960. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2002.
3. Covert Operations as a Tool of Presidential Foreign Policy: From the Bay of Pigs to Iran-Contra. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2006.
Champion, Brian. "Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 530-564.
The author covers from premodern times until 1939.
Cumming, Alfred. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2 Nov. 2006. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf]
The issue is whether certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities being conducted by the Department of Defense "statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees.... Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating CIA and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each."
Daugherty, William J. "Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 62-80.
"Since the Reagan years, the covert action approval and review processes have been such that (a) there is no possibility of a 'rogue' operation by the CIA, and (b) lawyers are present at every stage to insure that constitutional requirements, federal statutes, executive orders, and internal agency regulations are fully complied with."
Daugherty, William J. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
Clark comment: Although the author works much too hard in making his point that covert action is a tool of U.S. Presidents, not just of the CIA, this is a fine book of great value to any future discussion of the role of covert action in the making and implementing of American national security policy. It is, however, terribly thin on discussion of the Presidents since Reagan, an effect no doubt of the fact that Daugherty knew too much for the CIA to clear any references to unacknowledged actions. If I were teaching a national security or intelligence-related course at this time, Executive Secrets would be of great assistance.
Periscope 26.1 (2004), notes that the author "provides an overview of the nature and proper use of covert action as a tool of presidential statecraft and discusses its role in transforming presidential foreign policy into reality."
For Brown, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), the author's "approach is logical and lucid." He argues that covert action operations represent "viable foreign policy options" undertaken at the direction of the President. This "is a very timely and useful examination of a controversial, but necessary[,] aspect of foreign policy."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), notes that in examining "covert action policies and operations in each administration from Truman to Clinton," the author "shows that the level of activity varied more with international turmoil of the moment than with the party in power." Daugherty argues that covert action will "continue as an instrument of presidential policy when conventional methods short of war are unsuccessful," and he "provides ample justification for this position while illuminating this contentious topic with facts. This is a fine textbook and a valuable contribution."
Defty, Andrew. "'Close and Continuous Liaison': British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 100-130.
The author asserts that "the extent of cooperation between Britain and America in the field of anti-Communist propaganda was far greater than has previously been appreciated." The British Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) produced "discreet propagenda" targeted on the free world; the CIA's "mighty Wurlitzer" focused on the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries. Thus, "[i]n many respects British and American approaches to anti-Communist propaganda were complementary."
Godson, Roy. "Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards?" Society 38, no. 6 (Sep./Oct. 2001): 38-51.
Greenberg, Harold M. "Research Note: The Doolittle Commission of 1954." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 687-694.
This is an effort to resurrect the Doolittle Commission's review of covert action from the dustbin of history, to which it has been consigned by many historians. The main point is that "the secrecy of its progress and the narrow dissemination of its report cast doubt that the Doolittle Commission was calculated simply to outmaneuver Congress."
Grose, Peter. Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.
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