Saunders, Frances Stonor. Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. London: Granta, 1999. The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New York: New Press, 2000. Saunders, Frances Stonor. Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War. London: Granta, 1999. The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. New York: New Press, 2000.
According to Harkin, The Independent, 8 Jul. 1999, this work "is painstakingly researched ... and jauntily written, alive to the ironies of a campaign for cultural freedom whose boundaries were circumscribed by its shady sponsors.... Stonor Saunders introduces her work as a 'secret history' but her research shows that it was not, in practice, as secret as all that."
A reviewer for Publisher's Weekly, 21 Feb. 2000, calls this "a captivating, authoritative history of the CIA's secret campaign to turn American art into anti-Soviet cultural propaganda.... The only flaw in this thoroughly documented book ... is that the story is so richly convoluted that occasionally the larger drama gets lost in its overwhelming details."
Lapham, Los Angeles Times, 9 Apr. 2000, sees The Cultural Cold War as a "troubling and perceptive book." Although "[t]he story is not an easy one to tell," the author "doesn't pretend to knowledge that she cannot reliably document or reasonably infer," "writes with a sense of humor and an appreciation of the historical circumstances," "avoids polemic[,] and fits the fragments of elusive fact into a coherent and persuasive narrative."
In a lengthy review that clearly exhibits a lack of understanding of the motivations of the anticommunist left, Sharlet, Chronicle of Higher Education, 31 Mar. 2000, seems too entranced by the horror of it all -- the CIA sponsored literature and art! -- to apply any context to his comments.
From the other side of the spectrum, Laqueur, The National Interest 58 (Winter 1999-2000), finds little good to say about The Cultural Cold War, beyond acknowledging the author's diligent archival research. Laqueur places Saunders among the group of post-Cold War commentators who are "evidently unwilling to forgive [the Congress for Cultural Freedom] for having been prematurely right." On matters of substance, the author "proves to be less than a reliable guide," with "only a vague idea as to the identity and the views of ... dramatis personae" other than George Kennan. Her research in the archives and her interviews are "more than offset by political bias and primitive moralizing, unencumbered by knowledge of and interest in the historico-political context of the organization." West, IJI&C 13.1, falls on the same side of the debate as Laqueur, finding that the author "continues to peddle a grotesquely distorted perspective of the Cold War."
For Puddington, American Spectator, Jun. 2000, "Saunders has made good use of archival material unavailable until recently.... Unfortunately, The Cultural Cold War is equal parts scholarship and political bias.... Saunders adopts an arch, condescending tone toward the men who made the struggle against Communism their life's cause."
Troy, CIRA Newsletter 26.2/3 and Studies 46.1, concludes his detailed review with the following: "I do not share Frances Saunders' opinion about the 'morality' of CIA's activities and do not accept her notion that CIA undermined 'intellectual freedom' in Western Europe. I highly enjoyed and strongly recommend her book, however. Consider it to be similar to your favorite commercial TV broadcast: enjoy the program and ignore the commercials."
See W. Scott Lucas, "Revealing the Parameters of Opinion: An Interview with Frances Stonor Saunders," Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 15-40, for an interview with Saunders from January 2002.
Clark comment: It is interesting that even when she admits that she cannot document overt censorship by the CIA with regard to Encounter, Saunders can find what she calls "a kind of censorship by omission" because some authors did not get their material published. Saunders' skills as a researcher have not provided her the material findings to justify an attitude that basically says "if the CIA was involved, it had to have been bad." And references to the CIA's "grubby hands" do not advance our understanding of the subject under discussion.
Schorr, Daniel. "When Covert Is Overt." Christian Science Monitor, 10 Apr. 1998, 15.
Seymour: "Comments on the role of the United States Congress in covert intelligence operations by the CIA."
Silverberg, Marshall. "The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA's Covert Operations." Texas Law Review 68, no. 3 (Feb. 1990): 575-623.
Stern, Gary. "Covert Action and the Bush Administration." First Principles 15, no. 1 (1990): 4-5. [Petersen]
Trento, Joseph J. The Renegade CIA: Inside the Covert Intelligence Operations of George Bush. New York: Putnam, 1992.
Surveillant 2.6: According to the publisher, this book concerns "off-the-books, extraconstitutional operations around the world."
Turner, Robert F. "Coercive Covert Action and the Law." Yale Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 427-449.
Twentieth Century Fund. The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. With a background paper by Allan E. Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1992.
"Covert action is likely to remain an instrument of U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future.... At the same time, it is no longer possible to justify the enthusiasm and prominence covert action once enjoyed.... [S]ince the United States may need to hide its fingerprints on at least some operations, we need to set down some clear criteria for assessing proposed covert actions and establish effective institutions for both implementing and monitoring such activities."
According to Grose, FA 71.4, this is the work of a 15-member task force chaired by Harvard's Richard E. Neustadt. It "recommends tight new restrictions, mainly that overt means to achieve the same purpose be thoroughly canvassed first, that private action groups come under the same accountability requirements as government agencies and, most important, that covert action be undertaken only in support of policies that have been fully and publicly articulated. Notable is the eloquent dissent of task force member Hodding Carter III, who calls the practice an 'addiction' of the Cold War: 'To continue covert action now is to admit that we have become what we have fought.'"
Allen, DIJ 1.2, comments that although "much of this book rehashes old arguments," it is a "valuable compilation of resource material." Substantially after publication of this report, Warren, Intelligencer 14.2 (Winter/Spring 2005), opines that "[t]he bias of the task force ... precluded a real discussion of the issues." Essentially, "the report is incomplete and tainted."
To Johnson, I&NS 9.2, the "end result ... [is] outstanding ... despite its silly title." The report's recommendations call for more vigorous legislative oversight and thorough periodic review of ongoing covert actions. Its "weakest position ... is its willingness to accept post facto reporting to Congress on covert action." The report gives "a masterful summary of the key issues.... [It is] well organized, lucidly written, thorough, and sensitive to the ethical dimensions of covert action." This is the "best overview of the subject yet published."
Return to Covert Action Table
of Contents