COVERT ACTION

A Starting Point

 

The literature on covert action as a tool of national security policy is extensive and diverse. Presented here are some of the better general works on the subject; they represent nothing more than -- as the file title states -- a starting point.

Godson, Roy. Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995. JK468I6G62 Washington, DC: Transaction, 2001.

Clark Comment: Godson defines covert action as "influencing events in other parts of the world without revealing or acknowledging involvement." He defines counterintelligence as "identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting the intelligence activities of others." (p. xii) In this book, he traces the evolution of the practice of covert action and counterintelligence in the United States since 1945, develops some "ideal" principles and techniques for such practices, and analyzes the ongoing gap between principle and practice. The most disconcerting aspect of the book is the author's unusual packaging together of covert action and counterintelligence, two very different intelligence disciplines.

Nonetheless, Friedman, Parameters, Summer 1997, finds that "the combination does no violence to either. In fact the unusual combination supports the author's conclusion that appropriate use of 'dirty tricks' and effective counterintelligence enabled the United States to accomplish many important objectives that might otherwise have been unattainable by more conventional means." Cogan, I&NS 11.2, adds that the "unusual bracketing together of covert action and counterintelligence offers a different perspective from the conventional division in the intelligence business as between information-seeking on the one hand and direct action on the other."

Richelson, Proceedings, Jul. 1996, finds the book "disappointing in its failure to confront directly the future of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence activities.... [T]here is no detailed discussion of the international environment in which future U.S. covert action and counterintelligence operations will be conducted.... Godson's book, while useful as background, unfortunately does not take the reader into the future."

For Cohen, FA 74.5, much of Godson's effort "is taxonomic -- describing principles of both covert action and counterintelligence -- and necessarily general." Similarly, the AIJ 16.2/3 reviewer calls the work "a methodical, rational and most informative overview." It is "an excellent primer for those who wish to study the topic[s] in context. Highly recommended."

Breckinridge, WIR 15.2, sees Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards as "a valuable contribution to writing on the unusually complex fields of counterintelligence and covert action." The author provides a "focused bibliography," but has a "tendency to cite sources uncritically." The concluding chapter on reform has been "somewhat by-passed so far as practical application is concerned."

According to Sulc, IJI&C 9.1, the "United States sorely needs strong counterintelligence and covert action capabilities as it makes its way through the post-Cold War bush. Roy Godson has taken a giant step in the right direction by producing a very readable, eminently clear explanation of the subjects." In the same vein, Barrett, APSR 91.4, is impressed by the author's "knowledge of political and intelligence history," and finds that "his treatment of the nuts and bolts of counterintelligence and covert action has great depth."

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 08-01 (26 Feb. 2001), reports the publication of a new edition of this work. Godson has added "a substantial introduction ... that looks at ways in which counterintelligence and covert action might be adapted to the new security environment, in particular the growing political-criminal nexus in many strategic regions."

Prados, John. The Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II. New York: Morrow, 1986. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II Through Iranscam. New York: Morrow, 1988. [pb] Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf War. Rev. ed. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996.

Valcourt, IJI&C 1.3, says Prados has produced an "extremely well researched volume," but he "tarnishes his objectivity with the bias of some distorted criticism... which ... reduce[s] his work to a political tract under the guise of scholarship." Nevertheless, there is a "considerable amount of worthwhile information.... As a guide to the literature of the field, it is a gold mine." However, in his criticisms, he "fails to put the situation in perspective."

Although he finds the work somewhat numbing, Smith, I&NS 2.4, also believes The Presidents' Secret Wars "will be highly useful because Dr Prados has done serious archival work.... In one stroke this volume moves the study of covert operations to a higher and more sophisticated plane."

Rositzke, Harry. "America's Secret Operations: A Perspective." Foreign Affairs 53, no. 1 (Jan. 1975): 334-351.

Rositzke, Harry. The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977.

Rositzke died on 4 November 2002 at the age of 91. Bart Barnes, "Harry Rositzke Dies; Spymaster, Scholar," Washingtom Post, 7 Nov. 2002, B12.

Clark comment: Rositzke is identified on this book's dust jacket as having served two years with OSS and 25 years with the CIA, where his jobs included work in Munich in the early 1950s, station chief in New Delhi 1957-1962, and Washington assignments until his retirement in 1970.

Pforzheimer notes that the secret operations discussed are "heavily disguised as to places and dates." The author both praises and criticizes, and offers solutions to problems in his concluding chapter.

Constantinides finds that the focus of the book is on Rositzke's "major professional interest: secret operations against the Soviet Union.... His experience of secret operations and reflection give him a special perspective." Nonetheless, there are some "questionable facts and opinions" in the book.

Treverton, Gregory F. Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World. New York: Basic Books, 1987. JK468I6T72 Covert Action: The CIA and the Limits of American Intervention in the Postwar World. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1988.

Clark comment: Treverton's basic conclusion is difficult to argue with: In the 1990s "[m]ajor covert actions will become public -- sooner rather than later, and perhaps even before the operation is over." The question remains, however, just what this means to the future use of covert operations as an instrument of U.S. policy.

Petersen's description of this work as the "case against covert action by a Harvard professor who advised the Church Committee" is too narrow a view of Treverton's argument. Nonetheless, the main thrust of the work is cautionary.

Valcourt, IJI&C 5.2, sees the book as "essentially a polemic" that "falls far short" of Loch Johnson's book "in objectively assessing the Church committee's operations." On the other hand, Shultz, IJI&C 3.2, says that Treverton has made an "important and thoughtful contribution" to the debate over the place of covert action in U.S. foreign policy." The book is a "well written and strongly argued defense of his position" that covert action is a "last resort" approach.

Twentieth Century Fund. The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. With a background paper by Allan E. Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1992.

According to Grose, FA 71.4, this is the work of a 15-member task force chaired by Harvard's Richard E. Neustadt. It "recommends tight new restrictions, mainly that overt means to achieve the same purpose be thoroughly canvassed first, that private action groups come under the same accountability requirements as government agencies and, most important, that covert action be undertaken only in support of policies that have been fully and publicly articulated. Notable is the eloquent dissent of task force member Hodding Carter III, who calls the practice an 'addiction' of the Cold War: 'To continue covert action now is to admit that we have become what we have fought.'"

Allen, DIJ 1.2, comments that although "much of this book rehashes old arguments," it is a "valuable compilation of resource material." Substantially after publication of this report, Warren, Intelligencer 14.2 (Winter/Spring 2005), opines that "[t]he bias of the task force ... precluded a real discussion of the issues." Essentially, "the report is incomplete and tainted."

Johnson, I&NS 9.2, says the "end result ... [is] outstanding ... despite its silly title." The report's recommendations call for more vigorous legislative oversight and thorough periodic review of ongoing covert actions. Its "weakest position ... is its willingness to accept post facto reporting to Congress on covert action." The report gives "a masterful summary of the key issues.... [It is] well organized, lucidly written, thorough, and sensitive to the ethical dimensions of covert action." This is the "best overview of the subject yet published."

Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987. New York: Pocket Books, 1988. [pb] UB351U5W66

Simmons, IJI&C 2.2, argues that Woodward's "errors of fact ... are few and far between and, more often than not, involve narrative embellishments of a situation rather than mistakes in substance.... Probably the greatest value ... are his brilliant descriptions of the bureaucratic conflict between the legislative and executive branches in the arena of U.S. intelligence activities.... He captures the flavor of this struggle."

For Hartung, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jul. 1988, the "real subject" of this book "is Casey and his efforts to build U.S. intelligence capabilities across the board." Woodward has produced a "readable and at times engaging account of U.S. intelligence activities during the 1980s."

Blum, NameBase, notes that the book "is famous for its corny ending.... Other portions ... contain numerous nuggets of interest to historians, but it treats its stated subject entirely unsystematically -- various bits and pieces about each 'war' are scattered here and there."

To Powers, NYRB (19 Nov. 1987) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 283-294, the author has a typical "set piece -- detailed, suggestive, and fragmentary." The central account here is Casey's covert activities, and Woodward "for the most part only adds new details to stories that have already had the

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