VIETNAM

General

D - E

Davidson, Phillip B.

See "Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. and Army Intelligence Doctrine" at the Huachuca History Program under "Masters of the Intelligence Art": http://huachuca-www.army.mil/History/html/SiteMap.html.

1. Secrets of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990.

Petersen: "Detailed treatment of intelligence aspects of the war."

2. Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.

Petersen: "Ranking intelligence officer in Vietnam provides thin coverage of intelligence in this book."

DeForest, Orrin, and David Chanoff. Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

According to Surveillant 1.1, Slow Burn tells the story of a "CIA officer's creation of a spy network in Vietnam.... [He] describes the anxieties and frustrations of the final days of U.S. involvement." Petersen identifies the author as "a disillusioned CIA regional officer who personally handled defectors and agents."

Wirtz, IJI&C 4.2, notes that from November 1968 to Spring 1975, DeForest was a "CIA operations officer in the city of Bien Hoa.... [His] reminiscences are informative.... He provides a compelling description of a single CIA success amidst the general disaster that engulfed much of American intelligence during the war." This is a "useful contribution to the literature on the Vietnam war."

De Silva, Peer. Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence. New York: New York Times Books, 1978.

Clark comment: This is De Silva's memoir of his intelligence career from 1945 to 1973. He was the CIA Chief of Station in Vietnam 1964-1965, where he was injured by a terrorist bomb.

For Constantinides, much of what De Silva recounts about the Vietnam War "does not enlighten us about the intelligence effort and operations that provided the basis of his ... opinions." Pforzheimer finds that De Silva's presentation "suffers from the author's garrulous details of his personal life"; however, the book "brings out the flavor of an intelligence career."

Donahue, James C. Mobile Guerrilla Force: With the Special Forces in War Zone D. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

From advertisement: The Mobile Guerrilla Force was "an experimental Special Forces unit conceived to emulate the tactics of the Viet Cong guerrillas." In this book, Donahue relates the story of Operation Blackjack-31 "in January 1967 when 13 hand-picked Green Berets and a company of free Cambodian Guerrillas" slipped into the VC-controlled War Zone D. "Blackjack-31 was a historic departure from the conventional military thinking that dominated the war in Vietnam and clearly demonstrated that American-led indigenous forces could conduct guerrilla operations against the enemy."

Drachman, Edward R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 1997.

The authors offer a case study of one major decision for each president from Truman to Clinton. It is possible to argue that there are better potential cases for each president than the ones selected for study, but those chosen are interestingly fitted into the authors' novel countdown approach. The cases presented include Chapter 4 on Johnson's decision to end the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War and Chapter 5 on Nixon's decision to order the Cambodian incursion.

Larson, APSR 92.1, appreciates the authors' efforts to "present more objective criteria" than is normally the case in decision-making evaluation. Their evaluation scheme "seems plausible and reasonable on the face," but "it does not always work well when applied to specific cases." Nevertheless, "the case studies are well researched, concise, and provocative."

Dwyer, John B. Seaborne Deception: The History of U.S. Navy Beach Jumpers. New York: Praeger, 1992. [Seymour]

Englemann, Larry. Tears Before Rain: An Oral History of the Last Days of the Fall of South Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

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