WORLD WAR II

MAGIC

D - K

 

Deavours, Cipher A., and Louis Kruh. Machine Cryptography and Modern Cryptanalysis. Dedham, MD: Artech House, 1985. London: Adtech Book Co., 1985.

According to Petersen, the work "[f]ocuses on the inter-war period and the U.S. solution of Japanese codes." Sexton notes, however, that the authors continue their narrative through the introduction of cryptanalytic computers in the 1960s, and terms the work an "essential source for those concerned with cryptanalysis and Communications Intelligence."

DeBrosse, Jim, and Colin Burke. The Secret in Building 26: The Untold Story of America's War against the U-Boat Enigma Codes. New York: Random House, 2004.

Seamon, Proceedings 130.4 (Apr. 2004), notes that Building 26 on the National Cash Register campus in Dayton, Ohio, was where "the electromechanical giants that would help decipher Germany's complex Enigma code" were produced. While "the authors make a determined effort to explain the inner workings of Bombes, the average reader may have a tough time digesting unfamilar details.... But it will be worth the trouble." For Kruh, Cryptologia 29.2 (Apr. 2005), "[t]his excellent book is highly recommended."

Farago, Ladislas. The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster. New York: Random House, 1967. London: Arthur Barker, 1967. The Broken Seal: "Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor. New York: Bantam Books, 1968. [pb]

According to Constantinides, "[e]xperts have found the book unreliable as cryptological and intelligence history." Sexton finds that the book "[f]urnishes valuable background, but has been superseded by more recent works."

Gladwin, Lee A. "Did Sigint Seal the Fate of 19,000 POWs?" Cryptologia 30, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 2006): 199-211.

The author argues against the conclusion that JICPOA gave the coordinates of Japanese merchant ships carrying Allied POWs to ComSubPac knowing that POWs would be killed. The intercepts that led to the erroneous conclusion actually came the Japanese Water Transport Code system. This system did not provide indicators of the presence of POWs on the merchant ships. This article also offers some indicators of the significant conflicts between Army and Navy codebreaking organizations.

Hanyok, Robert J. Eavesdropping on Hell: Historical Guide to Western Communications Intelligence and the Holocaust, 1939-1945. Ft. George Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2005.

Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy) 2005, no. 54 (8 Jun. 2005), refers to this work as a "major historical study of communications intelligence (COMINT) regarding the destruction of European Jewry and other targeted populations during World War II." For Alvarez, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), "[t]his is a superb monograph" that "provides an informed overview of how American and British communication intelligence (Comint) agencies reported the Holocaust.... Those seeking a short [167 pages] but authoritative account of codebreaking and the Holocaust need look no further."

Harris, Ruth R. "The 'Magic' Leak of 1941 and Japanese-American Relations." Pacific Historical Review 50 (Feb. 1981): 77-96.

Sexton calls this an "objective examination" of the 1941 incident. Harris' version contradicts Ladislas Farago's account in The Broken Seal (see Chapter 15, "Moment of Crisis"). This is a "provocative and well written account."

Haufler, Hervie. Codebreakers' Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II. New York: New American Library, 2003.

Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, says that this is "a comprehensive account of the outstanding work by American and British codebreakers in the Allied victory.... Highlights of major battles in almost every major operation around the globe, on land, sea and in the air are included.... [The author] calls codebreaking 'the decisive factor'" in winning the war.

For Showers, NIPQ 24.2 (Apr. 2008), this is "without question the most comprehensive, clearly-written, accurate and revealing book on the world-wide efforts to provide intelligence support based on intercepted and exploited enemy communications for the benefit of U.S. and Allied forces in all theaters throughout the 1939 to 1945 duration of the war."

Haufler, Hervie. "The Greatest Intelligence Achievement in Navy History." World War II 17, no. 2 (Jul. 2002): 16-19.

The focus here is on Lt. Cdr. Joseph J. Rochefort's work in breaking the Japanese naval code.

History Channel. Secrets of War: Sworn to Secrecy -- Breaking the Japanese Codes. http://www.secretsofwar.com.

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 24.2, this one-hour documentary "uses still film and live action footage to provide an exciting history of code breaking by the United States." It is one of the 52-part "Secrets of War" series.

Jarvis, Sue. Japanese Codes. Bletchley Park Report no. 6. Bletchley Park, UK: Bletchley Park Co. Ltd., 1997.

Kruh, Cryptologia 22.2: Includes a discussion of "events leading up to Pearl Harbor, British/US intelligence cooperation before Pearl Harbor, and the attack on Ceylon and the Bay of Bengal."

Jeffries, John C., Jr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography. Riverside, NJ: Scribner's, 1994.

Surveillant 3.6: This is a "judicious biography" by a former law clerk. It includes "Powell's early work in OSS and his role in ULTRA intelligence."

See also, Putney, ed., Ultra and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview with Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr (1987).

Kahn, David. "Roosevelt, MAGIC, and ULTRA." Cryptologia 16, no. 4 (Oct. 1992): 289-319.

This is a brief history of the U.S. military cryptographic effort, including organization and message handling. The article concludes that "we historians can only say that we do not know how Roosevelt used MAGIC and ULTRA. And probably we never will." Reprinted in Cryptolog 14, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 1, 5, 11-12. This version does not include accompanying "documentation" published in the original.

Kahn, David. "World War II History: The Biggest Hole." Military Affairs 39, no. 2 (Apr. 1975): 74-77.

More research is needed on the role of codes and ciphers (and intelligence matters generally) in and on the war.

Komatsu, Keiichiro. Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of "Magic." New York: St. Martin's, 1999.

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, this is a "scholarly examination of Japan-U.S. relations in the twentieth century leading to the outbreak of the Pacific War.... [The author] shows how mistranslations of Magic messages produced significant elements of misunderstanding, followed by mistrust and deep suspicion. He believes it suggests the war could have been averted." For Boyd, I&NS 16.3, the author convincingly demonstrates the existence of mistranslations, but also overstates their strategic importance.

Kislenko, H-Diplo, Mar. 2001, and Intelligencer 12.1, finds that Origins of the Pacific War "offers much to the continuing debate on the U.S.-Japanese war. The book is immaculate in detail, and draws upon a wide array of both English and Japanese language sources. There is a good historiographical essay, an extensive bibliography, a very useful list of important MAGIC mistranslations, and a large selection of period diplomatic communications in both Japanese and English.... [This] is must-read for those interested in U.S.-Japanese relations, or the role that intelligence plays in shaping decision-making."

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